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RECENT CASES
tional basis standard of review strikes an equitable balance between the
interests of the community and the interests of the individual property
owner.38 By giving a strong presumption to local officials' findings of
special benefits, it permits the city to rely on a stable revenue source in
planning and executing local improvements. The spectre of suddenly hav-
ing to find money in the general revenue fund to pay for a street improve-
ment because of a judge's hindsight determination that the city council
erred in its findings of fact is largely removed. Yet property owners retain
the right to have the courts overturn a particular assessment where they
can show that there is no reasonable theory which could have justified a
finding of special benefits.
JAMES W. ERWIN
SECURITIES REGULATION-SHARE EXCHANGE
PURSUANT TO CORPORATE REORGANIZATION
NOT A "PURCHASE OR SALE"
In re Penn Central Securities Litigation'
The New York Central Railroad Company merged with the Penn-
sylvania Railroad Company in 1968 to form the Pennsylvania New York
Central Transportation Company. The name was later changed to Penn
Central Company (Penn Central). On April 1, 1969, the Penn Central
Holding Company (Holding Company) was organized. On May 13, 1969,
the shareholders of Penn Central approved a merger and reorganization 2
whereby all their stock in Penn Central was given to Holding Company
in return for the stock of Holding Company. Penn Central, now a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Holding Company and Holding Company's only as-
set, was renamed the Penn Central Transportation Company (Railroad)
several months later.3 In June 1970, Railroad began reorganization proceed-
ings pursuant to section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. The plaintiff-sharehold-
ers brought numerous actions under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
special benefits may, in a particular case, be based on a myth rather than, fact.
Nevertheless, it upheld the assessment. McQuiddy v. Smith, 67 Mo. App. 205
(K.C. Ct. App. 1896).
36. Comment, Special Assessments for Road Improvement Projects in Michi-
gan-What Standard of Trial Court Review?, 20 'WAYNE L. REv. 1073, 1091-96
(1974).
1. 494 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1974).
2. The court did not attempt to distinguish between a merger and a re-
organization, and no such distinction will be made in this note.
3. The facts are somewhat more complex than above stated. For a complete
description of the procedure used for bringing about the reorganization, see In re
Penn Central Securities Litigation, 335 F. Supp. 1026, 1030-1031 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
The result was that Holding Company had all the stock of Railroad, and the pub-
lic owned the stock of Holding Company.
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alleging that fraudulent and misleading financial information and proxy
materials were released in connection with the approval of the reorganiza-
tion.4 The defendants5 argued that section 10(b) of the Act0 was not
violated because the merger and reorganization did not constitute a "pur-
chase or sale" for purposes of that section. The Third Circuit, affirming the
granting of summary judgment for the defendants at the trial level,7 held
that the merger and reorganization could not be considered a purchase or
sale within the meaning of section 10 (b).
Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the Securities Exchange Commission
pursuant to section 10 (b), broadly forbids fraudulent or misleading prac-
tices in securities transactions.8 Both the section and the rule, however,
apply only to activity "in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity." The normal 10(b) case involves some transaction in securities
which fits the common law notion of a purchase or sale,0 although other
types of transactions have been held to come within the section and the
4. The opinion discussed sections 10 (b) and 13 (a) of the Act. The sec-
tion'13 (a) claim was dismissed by the court and will not be discussed in this note.
5. The defendants included certain companies in the Penn Central com-
plex, a number of their present and former officers and directors, and certain
independent accountants.
6. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b)
(1970), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale or any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in con.
travention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
7. The appellate decision is a review of two district court cases: In re Penn
Central Securities Litigation, 357 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa. 1973); In re Penn Central
Securities Litigation, 347 F. Supp. 1327 (E.D. Pa. 1972)..
8. Although the instant case discussed only section 10 (b) of the Act, rule
10b-5"is necessarily limited by any restrictions placed on the section by the courts.
The rule's purchase or sale requirement cannot be relaxed unless the restriction
is relaxed in regard to section 10(b) itself. Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1973),
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in- connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
9. See, e.g., Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1957),
cert. denied,'389 U.S. 977 (1967), rev'g 267 F. Supp. 508 (N.D. 111. 1966); Hooper
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rule.10 Contrary to prior decisions,'1 it is now clear that the surrender or
issuance of securities in a merger is a purchase or sale for purposes of sec-
tion 10 (b).12
The court in Penn Central, in determining whether the section ap-
plied to the corporate reorganization, did not reach the issue whether the
plaintiffs themselves were purchasers or sellers in connection with the al-
leged fraudulent scheme. 13 Rather, it faced the issue whether a purchase
or sale had in fact occurred.14 The plaintiffs' argument that there was a
purchase or sale rested on their claim that the reorganization resulted in
three significant changes in their interests as shareholders: (1) loss of their
rights to an appraisal of their stock; (2) an inability to intervene in bank-
ruptcy proceedings of Railroad; and (3) opportunities available for di-
versification by Holding Company which were not previously available
to Penn Central (now Railroad).
Loss of appraisal rights has been the basis for finding a purchase or
sale in prior cases. SEC v. National Securities, Inc.,' 5 which involved a
contemplated merger of two insurance companies and resultant loss of ap-
praisal rights, held that shareholders of the acquired firm "purchased'"
shares in the new company by exchanging them for their old stock. In
10. See, e.g., Ruckle v. Roto American Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964),
where a corporation issuing its own shares was deemed a seller.
11. National Supply Co. v. Leland Stanford Jr. University, 134 F.2d 689
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 773 (1943). In National. Supply Co. the court
stated that consolidation does not involve a sale of securities or an exchange
amounting to a sale, accepting the SEC's argument as amicus curias without dis-
cussion. See Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 977 (1967), rev'g 267 F. Supp. 508 (N.D. I1. 1966). In Dasho the SEC
reversed its position, arguing as amicus that an exchange of shares pursuant to a
merger is a sale so that the antifraud sections of the Act apply.
12. See, e.g., Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co.,
404 U.S. 6 (1971); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Company, 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Levin v. Great Western Sugar Co., 406 F.2d
1112 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 848 (1969). Actually, corporate mergers have
generated relatively little litigation involving rule lob-S. The probable reason
is the careful preparation which precedes the normal merger. There was no per-
tinent authority found by any party to the Penn Central litigation or by the dis-
trict or appellate courts dealing with corporate reorganizations under the pro-
visions of section 10 (b). See generally A. BROMBERG, SEcuRrmES LAw: FRAuD-SEC
RuLE lob-5 at § 6.5 (1968).
13. Whether the plaintiffs are purchasers or sellers in connection with the
alleged fraudulent scheme is determinative of whether they have standing to bring
an action under the section or the rule. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 945 (1952). For a discussion of the distinction between
this issue and the issue whether a purchase or sale has in fact occurred, see SEC
Rule lOb-5-"In Connection with the Purchase or Sale of any Security" Restriction:
Need for Analytical Precision, 5 COLUM. J. or L. S Soc. PROB. 28 (August 1969).
14. The court said that it need not decide the Birnbaum issue, 494 F.2d at
533, possibly confusing the distinctions of coverage under the rule and standing
under the rule and section. See note 13 supra. There are numerous instances
where the exchange of shares itself does not constitute a purchase or sale because
it is only incidental to an internal management decision-e.g., stock split, reverse
stock split, creation of a new class of stock, or change in par value. 494 F.2d at 534.
15. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
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Vine v. Beneficial Finance Company'6 a shareholder who was given the
alternative rights, in a short form merger, to exchange his shares for cash
or seek an appraisal, was held to be a "seller" who could assert a cause of
action for deceptive practices under the Act.' 7
In Penn Central four days prior to the date of the meeting in which
the reorganization was approved, the board of directors of Penn Central
elected to have the corporation governed by the Pennsylvania Business
Corporation Law (BCL).18 One result of this election was the immediate
loss of appraisal rights for dissenting shareholders, because such rights
were not available under the BCL. The shareholders contended that con-
sideration of this loss contributed to making the vote for or against re-
organization a significant investment decision. The court, however, noting
that the board of directors had complete authority to make the election at
any time, decided that any appraisal rights which had existed prior to
the voting for reorganization were eliminated by the BCL election rather
than by the reorganization. 9 Therefore, appraisal rights were irrelevant
to the shareholders' vote, and a determination whether loss of such rights
would require a significant investment decision was unnecessary. The Penn
Central court distinguished National Securities on the ground that any
loss of dissenters' appraisal rights in the latter case was a result of share-
holder approval of the merger, rather than a result of the independent
action of the directors.
The standard which the court applied is whether the shareholder
interest involved transformed the voting decision into an investment de-
cision. If a significant investment decision is involved, a purchase or sale
can be found. Had the election not been made before the shareholder
vote, there would have been a significant investment decision, because
then the shareholders could have considered a loss of appraisal rights in
casting their votes. If the "investment decision" standard is a good one,
then the conclusion reached by the Penn Central court was correct, be-
cause nonexistent rights could hardly affect the votes. One possible prob-
lem with this line of reasoning, however, is that the election for BCL cover-
age was probably a prerequisite to bringing about the reorganization. 20
If this were so, then the election would seem to be more important than
16. 574 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967). See Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissent-
ing Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 HARV. L. Rxv. 1189 (1964).
17. See also Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corporation, 241 F. Supp.
869 (D. ]Del. 1965), in which a purchase or sale was found where there was a loss
of appraisal rights in a corporate merger. But see Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co.,
341 F. Supp. 234 (D. Neb. 1972). "The shareholders of the surviving corporation
[to a merger], however, are not sellers of securities unless a sale is made pursuant
to dissenters' rights." Id. at 288.
18. PA. STAT. tit. 15, § 1001 et seq. (1967). Before the election by the direc-
tors, Penn Central was excepted from coverage of the BCL as a carrier. PA. STAr.
tit. 15, § 1004 (B) (2) (1967). The election merely made different provisions of
Pennsylvania law applicable.
19. The court found it unnecessary to decide whether appraisal rights ex-
isted originally.
20. The court mentioned this without discussion. 494 F.2d at 536.
[Vol. 41
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the typical internal management decision, which is considered to be out-
side the scope of section 10 (b).21
The second argument advanced for finding a purchase or sale was
that the reorganization resulted in the shareholders' loss of rights to
participate in bankruptcy proceedings of Railroad.2 2 The court admitted
that the loss of these rights might affect an investment decision, but then
decided that such an effect would not be significant. "The weight to be
given [these considerations] depends upon the value a shareholder would
reasonably attach to them in determining how to cast his vote on the pro-
posed reorganization .... "23 In casting a vote for the reorganization, the
shareholder would have to weigh the probable joint occurrence of: (1) a
highly remote and speculative bankruptcy; (2) not being in control of
Holding Company and therefore unable to be heard in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings as a matter of right; and (3) discretionary denial of the oppor-
tunity to be heard as a minority in the bankruptcy proceedings. The prob-
ability of these occurrences was believed to be so small that it would be
unlikely that any individual shareholder, in casting his vote, would con-
sider them. Therefore, the court determined that the "loss of [such]
rights deserves minimal weight." 24
The court's language indicates that the loss of the right to be heard
in bankruptcy may, under certain circumstances, cause a reorganization to
be considered a purchase or sale. Where the likelihood of bankruptcy is
high, a shareholder vote on reorganization would be a significant invest-
ment decision, because a shareholder would reasonably be concerned about
his future opportunity to be heard in bankruptcy proceedings. Even where
the probability of bankruptcy is slight, and the corresponding effect on
the investment decision in minimal, the loss of participation rights may be
considered in conjunction with other affected interests in concluding that
the voting decision was a significant investment decision. That is, con-
siderations which alone deserve minimal weight may in combination be
of significant importance to a shareholder in making his investment de-
cision.
The remaining argument of the plaintiffs was that the reorganization
provided an opportunity not previously available for diversification into
nonrailroad areas of business.25 Although opportunity to diversify was not a
21. See Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life 9- Casualty Co., 404
U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
22. Under the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 205 (c)(13) (1970), only share-
holders have the right to be heard in such proceedings, and after the reorganization
in this case all of Railroad's stock was held by Holding Company. Participation by
the shareholders of Holding Company in the proceedings was a matter for the
discretion of the reorganization court. Furthermore, as non-shareholders they ap-
parently could no longer combine daims so that joint holdings might be suf-
ficient to justify intervention by a representative.
23. 494 F.2d at 537.
24. Id.
25. Before the reorganization, Railroad as a carrier could not issue any se-
curities without first obtaining the approval of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission. 49 U.S.C. § 20a (1970). Formation of a holding company would open up
1976]
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certainty, it was sufficiently probable to be a consideration for the share-
holders when they cast their votes. The court acknowledged the potential
importance of this consideration, but, again, dismissed it as being in the na-
ture of internal corporate restructuring. The court reasoned that this kind
of diversification would be handled in the typical corporation by an
amendment to the articles of incorporation,2 6 and the only reason it was
done differently in this case was because of the statutory restrictions ap-
plied to railroads. The elements entering into the decision of the sharehold-
ers in Penn Central were said to be the same as those typically confronting
any shareholder voting on the enlargement of the charter purposes of his
corporation.
This reasoning, however, is not completely persuasive. The facts should
be considered as they occurred rather than as they might have occurred.
The question whether there was a significant investment decision involved
was not discussed. Clearly, diversification potential could be a primary
consideration for shareholders, which would allow the finding of an in-
vestment decision as a basis for a purchase or sale. The court instead
focused on the result of the decision-the restructuring of an existing cor-
poration with no significant change in assets. So, even though a shareholder
vote was necessary and investment considerations were involved, it was
found to be in the nature of an internal management decision, because
it might have been handled differently.
The ultimate issue, as phrased by the court, was whether the reorgani-
zation was in effect an "internal corporate management decision" which
only incidentally involved an exchange of shares, or whether it was a major
corporate restructuring requiring the same kind of "investment decision"
by the shareholders as would a proposed merger with a separate existing
corporation.27 Although the result reached by the court seems desirable, its
conclusions from the application of this test to at least two of plaintiffs'
arguments are questionable. Loss of ability to participate in bankruptcy
proceedings could well have reasonably affected an investment decision, but
this consideration was dismissed because of the speculative nature of that
loss. The court simply concluded that loss of participation rights was an
outgrowth of an internal management decision rather than one typically
following from a sale of shares or a merger of two corporations. Failure to
consider the reorganization as a significant investment decision involving
potential for diversification is even more questionable. The fact that a
transaction could have been completed by corporate management in a
manner other than a shareholder vote should not of itself preclude a find-
ing of a purchase or sale.
the possibility that the ICC might decline jurisdiction over Holding Company's
issuance of securities, thus allowing diversification. 49 U.S.C. § 5 (3) (1970).
26. Internal corporate action amending the articles of incorporation would
not be in the nature of a "purchase or sale" of stock in one corporation for
stock in another corporation. 494 F.2d at 539.
27. 494 F.2d at 534. 6
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The court apparently believed that this type of reorganization did not
involve enough of a change in shareholder interests to be considered a
purchase or sale-i.e., it is a matter of degree.2 8 If the test for finding a
purchase or sale is whether the change of interest was in the nature of an
"internal management decision" as opposed to a "significant investment de-
cision" of the shareholders, then it will be a difficult one to apply. The
problem in Penn Central is that the court appeared to use these terms as
conclusory labels in order to support a decision that was probably based
on policy considerations. 29
The requirement of a purchase or sale as a limitation on section 10 (b)
actions is desirable for several policy reasons. Failure to limit section 10 (b)
would transform it into a general federal law of corporate fiduciary duty.
The section would quickly encroach on the area of traditional state com-
mon law liability for fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs.3 0
There might also be an increase of vexatious litigation.31 These results
were not part of the congressional intent in section 10 (b).32 Furthermore,
Congress delegated responsibility to the SEC, and not to the courts, to
promulgate rules under section 10 (b). The large amount of litigation
28. A number of cases restrict "purchase or sale" to the concept of considera-
tion. See, e.g., Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907
(1949); Ingenito v. Bermec Corp., 376 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Other cases
suggest that the restrictive concept of consideration is not desirable. See, e.g.,
Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., __ F.2d __ , CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. f 95,323 (2d Cir. 1975); Hooper v. Mountain State Securities Corp.,
282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961) (stock in exchange
for worthless assets was a sale, despite the fact that there was no consideration).
The Penn Central court avoided analyzing the reorganization in terms of con-
sideration.
29. The Penn Central court may have been influenced by International Con-
trols Corporation v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
932 (1974), decided two months before the instant case, which confronted this
issue in an analogous factual situation. The effects of the Vesco transaction on
shareholder rights were not so great as those in the Penn Central reorganization,
but both Vesco and Penn Central differ from the typical merger between two
separate corporations, where the original shareholders of each corporation end
up with stock in a substantially different company with substantially different as-
sets and prospects.
The Penn Central court distinguished National Securities because the share
exchange in National Securities accompanied the merger of two separate and dis-
tinct corporate entities. But see Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970)
(defendants controlled, but did not wholly own, all corporations to be merged,
and a purchase and sale was found). Cf. Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d'77 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954): "(T)he transaction was ... a mere trans-
fer between corporate pockets .... Until ... some new individuals . . . enter
the picture there has been no real sale of stock." 212 F.2d at 80.
30. See Ciechon, The Decline of the Purchaser-Seller Requirement of Rule
10b-5, 14 VILL. L. Rnv. 499 (1969); Bradford, Rule lob-5: The Search for a Limit-
ing Doctrine, 19 BUFFALO L. Rlv. 205 (1970).
31. This problem is considered in the Birnbaum context of standing in Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975).
32. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 95 S. Ct. 1917, 1924 (1975);
Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971);
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